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The Crew 2 Crack


August 8th - The crew finished Birch Lane from Northside Boulevard to Madison Road, Norco Way, N Franklin Boulevard, N Devlin Way, and Fargo Avenue. W Karcher Road is 1/3 complete. Signs are in place. Tomorrow the crew will start on W Karcher Road.




The Crew 2 crack


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August 4th - Fog seal on Middleton Road from the Boulevard to W Flamingo Ave, Birch Lane from N Franklin Boulevard to Madison Road, and Madison Road form Birch Lane to E Karcher Road is finished. Sweeping continues and signs are in place for the weekend. Monday, Aug 8th, the crew will start on Birch Lane.


August 3rd - Fog seal on Midway Road, Moss Lane, W Flamingo Avenue, and Middleton Road from Chacartegui Lane to Caldwell Boulevard is now complete. Signs have been checked and are in place, sweeping continues. Tomorrow the crew will start on Middleton Road from the Boulevard to W Karcher Road


August 2nd - The following roads are complete N Canyon Street, Davis Avenue from Yale to N Canyon Street, Lone Star Road, and N Midland Boulevard. Signage is in place and sweeping continues. Tomorrow the crew will start on Midway Road.


The Ranch Subdivision - N Midland Boulevard from the Boulevard to W Orchard Avenue - W Orchard Avenue N Midland Boulevard to the Boulevard - Davis Avenue from N Midland Avenue to Purple Sage and Midland from W Orchard Avenue to Smith. Signage is in place and sweeping continues. Tomorrow the crew will start in Eaglecrest Subdivision along with adjacent roads.


Tomorrow the crew will finish up 4th Street North from Northside Boulevard to North Broadmore Way and Railroad Street between North Broadmore Way to the end of the street. Once complete, the crew will clean the chip spreader and switch to 1/4" chips before starting in the Ranch Subdivision.


Black Panther and the Crew finally crack the case surrounding the mysterious death of Harlem community pillar Ezra Keith! In the wake of Ezra's life one thing is certain: the world needs the Crew now more than ever!


22. During the afternoon and night of the 14th and up until about 4:15 P.M. on the 15th, the vessel encountered heavy weather. There was a snowstorm and freezing temperature. There was a heavy sea from the north-north-east (changing to north on the morning of the 15th), and the vessel was pitching, rolling and shipping some water. The wind was undoubtedly strong but how strong it is impossible to say. The log entries are not reliable. The rough log gives the force as 12 on the Beaufort scale. The smooth log written up after the accident gives it as 10. Neither entry was signed. I do not accept either entry. The storm had started before the vessel which carried a few passengers as well as cargo, left port. At about 9:00 P.M. on the 14th, she was hove to and her speed reduced. On the morning of the 15th the lashings of deck cargo aft of the bridge loosened. However, the crew were able safely to correct this and secure the cargo when the ship's course was changed to accommodate her to the sea. Except for this, there was no damage to gear or cargo and no injury to passengers or crew during the heavy weather. The owner certainly did not prove that the weather was any worse than a well found and properly manned ship should be able to withstand; or indeed that it was any worse than her experienced master expected when he left port.


25. At about 6:45 the master and chief mate having finished dinner, which was taken with the passengers, went to the bridge. The master remarked that the vessel was riding well. Suddenly they heard "a scraping sound" and "felt *414 a bump" and saw the derricks on the fore part of the deck move forward. In less than thirty seconds the vessel had broken in two at a point about the middle of the number 3 hatch. The master immediately sounded the signal for passengers and crew to take lifeboat stations. He also ordered radio distress signals sent out.


40. The large-scale construction of all-welded ships was begun in the United States during World War II. Most of the ships so produced were dry-cargo freighters of the so-called "Liberty" type. A serious problem arose out of numerous instances in which ships of this type suffered fractures. A Board of Investigation appointed by the Secretary of the Navy stated in a report dated July 15, 1946, that the factors responsible for failures in welded ships built in the United States were weaknesses in (a) design, (b) workmanship, and (c) material. This report further stated that, "until experience can be had with vessels constructed under normal conditions, of improved design, with carefully checked, high quality workmanship, and employing steel of low notch sensitivity, some form of crack arresters, i. e. two or more slots cut in the deck or sides of the ship covered with plating that is riveted in place should be incorporated in all large welded vessels."


43. The American Bureau of Shipping did not then and does not now require the installation of crack arresters in welded vessels which were built without them. Neither does it require crack arresters in new buildings.


45. Lloyd's rules, up to the time of this disaster, did not require the owner of the Christer Salen to fit her with crack arresters, nor did Lloyd's suggest that crack arresters be installed during the repair of the stranding damage in 1950.


48. Lloyd's considered installation of crack arresters inadvisable for welded ships built in Britian and in Sweden because (1) such ships had been built without the difficulties encountered in building Liberties in the United States, i. e. poor design, inexperienced workmen, and use of notch sensitive steel which resulted from a shortage of manganese in the United States and in turn resulted in ship steel with an excess of carbon; (2) Lloyd's believed that the work of installing crack arresters might create notches in the ship's plates which could be the starting points of fractures.


49. The nature of the damage sustained by the Christer Salen in the Silino stranding, in the opinion of Lloyd's experts, proved that her steel was not brittle but ductile. The plates of the Christer Salen were only one-half as thick as those in Liberty ships and thus were less likely to crack.


The libellants do not contend that the owner's failure to discover the defect in the starboard sheer strake plate constituted lack of due diligence. They contend rather that in light of the "mass of data known to all those interested in *416 shipping, long before 1950, establishing the dangers presented by a welded ship; * * * in the exercise of ordinary prudence, Lloyd's, as the vessel owner's agency which it employed to make the vessel seaworthy, should have required the installation of crack arresters when the vessel was being repaired at Gothenberg in 1950"; that Lloyd's was negligent in failing so to require and its negligence "was lack of due diligence by the vessel owner."


These contentions are rejected. There was, it is true, considerable data concerning the failures of welded ships built in the United States. However, as the findings show, that data revealed conditions as to design, workmanship and quality of steel in the American ships which Lloyd's, for adequate reasons, concluded did not obtain in welded ships such as the Christer Salen. The studies of welded ship failures in the United States showed that the steel in those ships was brittle because it contained an excess of carbon over manganese; and being one inch in thickness was more likely to crack than thinner steel. Lloyd's found in 1950 upon examining the Christer Salen's steel damaged in the stranding, that it was not brittle but ductile. And it was only one-half inch thick. Moreover, at that time no dry cargo ship such as the Christer Salen classified by Lloyd's, had ever suffered a fatal fracture. Lloyd's experts studied all the data on ship fractures compiled by both the United States and Britain. They came to the conclusion that the defects in material and design which were the chief causes of failure in the United States Liberties, were absent in ships built in Sweden at the time of the Christer Salen's construction. Furthermore, they then believed that the work of installing crack arresters in existing ships could and might produce notch effects in their plates which in turn could and might initiate fractures. These conclusions were not arrived at arbitrarily or carelessly but after serious extended study. Indeed their views found considerable support in the fact that the Americans had not installed crack arresters in at least half of all existing Liberty ships and in the further fact that the American Bureau of Shipping did not require their installation in existing welded ships. In these circumstances there is no reasonable basis for holding Lloyd's negligent in following the views of their own experts rather than others.[2]


The libellants further contend that since the shipowner may not delegate its duty to exercise due diligence, its reliance on Lloyd's is not enough to exempt it from liability. The argument is that since the owner itself knew or is charged with knowing all of the data gathered in the United States, in light of that data, Lloyd's views to the contrary notwithstanding, the owner in the exercise of due diligence should have ordered the installation of crack arresters when the vessel was being repaired in 1950. This argument seems to me to read "due diligence" out of the statute. In view of the sharp difference of opinion between Lloyd's experts and some, though not all, American experts, I think common prudence dictated that the owner rely on the judgment of those experts under whose supervision its vessel had been built and repaired and who regularly surveyed and passed it for classification as a seaworthy vessel.[3] Mr. Murray testified that if the owner had proposed installing crack arresters in 1950, Lloyd's, in his opinion, would have disapproved. This the libellants urge should be disregarded as "speculation * * * advanced in defense of Lloyd's without any reasonable basis." I think, on the contrary, that this opinion has a very reasonable basis. Indeed, disapproval of such a proposal by the owner, appears to be the only position Lloyd's could have taken consistent with the views of its experts. Mr. Murray impressed me as highly competent and *417 equally trustworthy. He was, to be sure, defending Lloyd's and his own position. But on both direct and cross-examination he obviously tried to be objective, frank and entirely fair. The reasons he gave for this and other opinions seemed to me altogether plausible and reasonable. I accept his opinion. 041b061a72


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